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What is the legal relationship between a trade union and its constituency in non-statutory 
bargaining? 
In the statutory arena one facet at least, the interaction between union and employer 
parties at industrial council level, is defined by the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 (LRA). 
The other crucial nexus, that between the union and its constituents, is not expressly 
defined but can be construed in the context of the statutory process. 1   This may be one 
reason why the issue has given rise to relatively little litigation 2   or debate. 
No comparable framework exists within which to situate non-statutory bargaining. Case law 
on the subject, though on the increase, is still meagre. Three such cases are reviewed 
below. All three turn on the question whether agreements (purportedly) entered into by 
union officials had in fact been authorized by members of the union and, hence, whether the 
agreements were valid. In all three cases the agreements were upheld though with little in 
the way of a common rationale to underpin future legal development. This article will argue 
that the key to the development of a coherent approach lies in a more consistent application 
of the principle of majoritarianism. 
 
 
Ramolesane & another v Andrew Mentis & another 3 
In Ramolesane the appellants were two workers who had previously been involved, with 
their union, in an Industrial Court action for reinstatement based on 'their alleged unlawful 
[sic] dismissal'. 4   This was settled by an agreement reached between the employer and a 
union official. Subsequent to the settlement, the two instituted a further action against the 
employer. In these subsequent proceedings, the employed filed a special plea to the 
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effect that the appellants were precluded from proceeding with their action. The appellants 
argued that the official had not been authorized to conclude the agreement on their behalf. 
The Industrial Court upheld the special plea, ruling that there had been 'an implied authority 
and also an ostensible authority' for the official to do so. 5 
On appeal Van Schalkwyk J endorsed the principle of majoritarianism to the effect that 
'where the collective interests of the union conflict with the interests of an individual 
member, it only makes sense . . . that the collective interests of the members as a whole 
should prevail'. 6   A party who wishes to rely on majoritarianism, the court held, needs 'to 
demonstrate, not merely that the settlement concluded was in the interests of the union as 
a whole, but that it was in the interests of the majority of those persons affected thereby'. 7   
This requirement must be met by the presentation of evidence: 
 'If [the official] has an implied authority to conclude an agreement that is beneficial to the union, then the 
implied authority is not proven until evidence of that benefit is given.' 8 
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The court held that there had been no such evidence in this case. Nevertheless it found that 
the appellants were estopped from relying on an absence of authorization. The official had 
stipulated in writing that he was duly authorized to conclude the agreement on behalf of the 
applicants. The appellants' 'actual or at least tacit consent that the union was authorized to 
continue to act on their behalf in pursuing the application, establishes the basis for the 
estoppel'. 9 
The fact that the appellants had not been present when the settlement was concluded raises 
the question how they could have been aware of its terms and, hence, how they should 
have gone about withdrawing or denying the official's authority to accept on their behalf. 
Yet, surprisingly, the court found that this circumstance counted against them: 
 '[H]aving once authorized the union to act on their behalf . . . and, having thereafter absented themselves from 
the further proceedings, they 
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created the impression in the minds of the representatives of the first respondent that the union was authorized to 
act on their behalf.' 10 
These findings, with respect, are questionable. The suggestion that the appellants had 
'absented themselves' from negotiations which, by definition, the union had been appointed 
to conduct on their behalf, suggests that there is a duty on union members to be present at 
such negotiations in order to keep a watchful eye on their representatives and alert the 
employer party if the union officials go beyond their brief. This, surely, negates the concept 
of collective bargaining. The plea of estoppel should not have been upheld since there was 
no representation by the appellants that could have given rise to it. 
The problem can only be unravelled if we distinguish between the two elements of 
'authorization' - firstly, the appointment of the representative (ie, its identity) and, 
secondly, the nature and extent of the authority which the representative is given (ie, its 
mandate). In Ramolesane it was not in dispute that the union had been appointed to 
represent the appellants or that the official in question had been duly appointed to 
represent the union. The point in issue was whether the union had authority to enter into 
the agreement which it purported to do on the appellants' behalf - in other words, its 
mandate. 
The court unfortunately did not address this issue. The authority given by union members to 
a union to negotiate on their behalf will not necessarily anticipate all the contingencies 
which the negotiators may have to address (though certain non-negotiable minima may be 
stated). To this extent the union's authority can only be implied. This takes us back to the 
finding by Van Schalkwyk J that a union's implied authority can only be to conclude an 
agreement that is beneficial to a majority of the members directly affected but that no 
evidence had been placed before the court. 
It does not follow that the union had necessarily exceeded its mandate. Majoritarianism 
implies, as Van Schalkwyk J pointed out, that 'there will inevitably be groups of people . . . 
who will contend, with justification, that a settlement was against their interests. None the 
less, because of the principle of majoritarianism, such decision must be enforceable against 
them also'. 11   It may be that the settlement reached was indeed in the interests of or 
supported by the majority of the union members affected. This was never established; yet 
the appellants found themselves for all practical purposes in the position of a disaffected 
minority. 
Can the decision be justified by considerations of public policy? 
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Inconvenience would no doubt have resulted if the appeal had been upheld. The settlement 
(possibly supported by a majority of the original applicants) would have been invalidated 
and, unless a new settlement was reached, the applicants would have been able to resume 
proceedings in the Industrial Court. Bargaining relations between the employer and the 
union would have been dealt a blow. Although these issues were not addressed, it is likely 
that the court was not unmindful of them. But hard cases make bad law. The interpretation 
of the estoppel doctrine in this judgment is one which, if followed, could open the door to a 
degree of arbitrariness in bargaining conduct by employer as well as union representatives 
which could in due course undermine the legitimacy of collective bargaining. 
 
 
Food & General Workers Union & Others v Sundays River Citrus Co-operative Co 
Ltd 12 
The Food & General Workers Union case graphically illustrates this danger. Following a wage 
dispute the employer and the union agreed on an incentive scheme; there was, however, 
confusion about its implementation. At one of the respondent's two pack-houses, the 
Hermitage pack-house, this gave rise to a strike as a result of which most of the day shift 
were dismissed. After negotiations a further agreement was reached on 12/13 September 
1991 providing for re-employment of the dismissed workers on condition that 'all workers' 
maintained certain production targets for the remainder of the season. In the event workers 
at the other pack-house, the Kirkwood pack-house, failed to reach these targets and, in 
terms of the abovementioned agreement, were offered a pro rata portion of their wages. 
When they refused to accept this, the company made up the shortfall out of their bonus and 
paid them a correspondingly reduced bonus. The union asked that this should be declared 
an unfair labour practice. 
The central issue was whether the agreement of 12/13 September was intended to apply 
only to the Hermitage day shift, whose re-employment was its immediate subject-matter, or 
to the Kirkwood workers as well. In the preamble 'workers' was defined as 'all the members 
of the union employed by the company as at 10 September 1991'. 13   According to the 
union 'the intention of the general secretary [who negotiated with the company and its 
attorney] was that the agreement should apply only in respect of the dismissed workers and 
that meant the day shift at Hermitage'. 14   The company, on the other hand, argued that 
'the board of directors had made it a requirement for the re-employment of the dismissed 
workers that all the workers at both pack-houses should 
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achieve the level of production referred to [therein]'. 15   While accepting that the 
agreement was 'bizarre', John AM concluded that 'the probabilities are that its effect is what 
the respondents contend'. 16 
At least two questions are raised by these facts, both of which go to the heart of the 
agreement. The first is whether there was consensus between the parties. The company's 
attorney was adamant that re-employment of the Hermitage day shift would be subject to 
an agreed production quota not only at Hermitage but also at Kirkwood and that this was 
put to the union side at the meeting of 12/13 September. It appears that the situation was 
confused and not conducive to clear communication. It was late at night and hundreds of 
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workers were 'anxiously awaiting the outcome of the discussions'. 17   On top of this the 
company's attorney realized belatedly that he had omitted an important condition and 
allegedly returned to the union caucus to convey it. 
Against this background the union's general secretary declared that he 'did not apply his 
mind to [the definition of "workers"] as he was exhausted' and took the word 'as referring 
to the dismissed workers'. 18   '[I]f the agreement had referred to Kirkwood', he said, 'he 
would have objected'. 19   Significantly, John AM accepted that '[i]t would undoubtedly 
have been desirable that the effect of the agreement should have been spelt out more 
clearly' 20   and that '[t]he circumstances in which the agreement was drawn up . . . did 
not assist the achievement of perfection in drafting'. 21 
The problem would not have arisen if John AM had rejected the evidence of the general 
secretary; but this was not the case. As noted above, the learned member came to the 
more cautious conclusion that 'the probabilities are that [the agreement's] effect is what the 
respondents contend'. 22   This finding, however, merely substitutes one difficulty for 
another. If the company had not intended to confine the agreement to the Hermitage day 
shift only, or if the general secretary had been mistaken in believing otherwise, it would 
mean that the parties had not been ad idem as to the subject-matter of their agreement. 
This would render the agreement void. 23 
A second and more fundamental question is whether the agreement intended by the 
company could have been valid even if the parties had been entirely ad idem. The 
respondent's case was 
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that the general secretary was negotiating on behalf of the Kirkwood workers and validly 
bound them to the productivity agreement. In the light of the evidence this is an 
extraordinary construction. At least three problems present themselves: 
(a) No express authority was given by the Kirkwood workers to the union to enter into the 
agreement of 12/13 September. It appears to have been common cause that 'no shop 
stewards or other representatives of the Kirkwood workers [were] present at the 
meeting' and, it was argued on the union's behalf, 'the general secretary could not 
have got a mandate from them'. 24   A subsequent letter from the company to the 
union made quite clear the factual situation as well as the company's peculiar 
understanding of majoritarianism: 
  'At our meeting of 23 September 1991 you agreed that the reason for the Kirkwood 
workers not reaching the agreed levels is because they have rejected the 
agreement. This state of affairs is unacceptable. The company has been negotiating 
with you in good faith and expects of you that when you enter into an agreement 
with the company, your members should honour such an agreement.' 25 
  Though regarded by John AM as 'justifiable comment', the passage suggests that 
the agreement had not only been entered into without the knowledge or consent of 
the Kirkwood workers but that, far from ratifying it subsequently, they had 
specifically rejected it. According to the rules of stipulatio alteri or any other 
principle of representation known to our law it is difficult to see how a binding 
agreement could have come into existence. 
(b) The recognition agreement between the company and the union provided for the 
union's right to 'represent the interests of' and act as 'bargaining agent' for its 
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members. It provided for 'representation' of union members by five shop stewards per 
pack-house on behalf of permanent employees and an additional five shop stewards 
per pack-house on behalf of seasonal employees. 26   The union's 'negotiating team', 
on the other hand, would consist of a maximum of four 'representatives' elected by 'all 
employees' plus not more than two union officials. From the judgment it does not 
appear that the union was represented by its formal negotiating team at the meeting 
of 12/13 September but, rather, by the general secretary and a 'caucus' of Hermitage 
shop stewards. 
  Was this seemingly ad hoc union assembly duly constituted to represent its 
members in general and the Kirkwood workers in particular in terms of the 
recognition agreement? 
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  While the recognition agreement did not stipulate that the 'negotiating committee' 
should include 'representatives' of both pack-houses, John AM nevertheless 
accepted that 'this had always been the practice'. 27   It is therefore arguable that 
the Kirkwood workers had acquired a customary right to be represented at 
negotiations which affected them. At the very least it would appear unfair to deny 
them an entitlement which they had previously enjoyed, particularly in respect of 
negotiations which led to important changes in labour practices. 28   If this is so 
the negotiations were flawed and, like any other flawed procedure, should have 
been dealt with accordingly by the court. 29 
(c) Finally, having accepted that no shop stewards or other representatives of the 
Kirkwood workers were present on the night of 12 September and noting the 
argument that the general secretary could not have got a mandate from them, John 
AM stated: 
  'The respondent's reply to this was that it is not for the employer to satisfy itself, in 
the sort of circumstances that prevailed in this case at that time, that the trade 
union has a mandate, nor could it have been expected that because the respondent 
had not been asked to provide transport for the workers from Kirkwood that it 
should have been aware that no mandate had been obtained. This response seems 
to me to be fully justified.' 30 
  Justified or not, this does not seem to offer authority for the proposition that the 
company was entitled to rely on implied authority of the union to represent the 
entire workforce in the negotiations. The company had full knowledge of 
established negotiating procedures. It alleged that the Kirkwood workers had 
rejected the previous productivity agreement and, given 
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  the objects of the LRA, must be presumed to have desired this time to reach an 
agreement that would prevent conflict. The fact that the union had not requested 
transport from Kirkwood certainly gave no grounds for believing that the Kirkwood 
workers were represented as in the past (and, incidentally, corroborates the 
general secretary's contention that the union had regarded the negotiations as 
relating to the Hermitage strikers only). 31   In the circumstances it is submitted 
that no implied authority can be construed. 
  On the one hand the criterion laid down in Ramolesane's case was conspicuously 
absent. No evidence was led that the productivity agreement was 'beneficial' to a 
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majority of the union members concerned; if anything, it implied more onerous 
conditions of work. Unfortunately John AM did not address this question; instead he 
based his decision on the reasonableness or otherwise of the conduct of the 
company. In the 'circumstances that prevailed' he found the company was entitled 
to assume that the union had the necessary authority to agree to the terms which 
it intended proposing at the meeting. 
  The rules of implied agency suggest a different conclusion. On the facts it was 
obvious that no express authority had been or could have been given by the 
Kirkwood workers to the union to accept the terms that were put to the union on 
12/13 September. Gibson explains the consequence of this: 
  'Where a principal has given an agent express authority, the onus of proving an 
implied authority over and above the express authority given is a very heavy 
burden. "Very strong proof" of the implied authority is necessary. . . . It is the duty 
of a third person dealing with an agent to make all proper inquiries to ascertain the 
extent of the agent's powers and to determine whether the act or contract to be 
consummated comes within the province of the agency.' 32 
  What will be expected of a third person in a given situation to discharge this burden 
of proof is debatable. 33   In the present case, however, the court accepted that 
the company had made no effort of any kind to verify the union's authority and, 
moreover, saw no need for it to do so. Subsequent events showed the dangers of 
such a policy not only in a legal 
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  sense - though these were avoided by the judgment of the Industrial Court - but 
also from an industrial relations point of view. 
 
 
Majoritarianism Turned on Its Head? 
The model of majoritarianism projected by this judgment is untenable. The problem is 
compounded by the following elaboration of why the lack of a mandate by the Kirkwood 
workers should not prevent the union from binding them: 
 'In any event . . . there were representatives of both pack-houses present when the agreement of 5 September 
[ie, the previous agreement] was concluded, yet immediately thereafter the Kirkwood workers purported to 
repudiate that agreement. It was not unreasonable of the respondent's counsel to suggest that their response 
would have been the same in regard to the agreement of 12/13 September even if their representatives had 
been present. 34 
'A third person', writes Wille, 'that is a person who is not an original party to a contract, can 
incur no liability under it unless he accepts such liability later on. 35   Leaving aside 
disputes of fact, the abovequoted passage turns this well-established legal principle on its 
head: workers who were not parties to a 'contract' are deemed to be bound by it even if 
they expressly indicate their refusal to accept liability under it. Such a rule would spell the 
end of majoritarianism or, indeed, any coherent notion of collective bargaining. Far from the 
majority binding the minority, union representatives would be vested with ill-defined but 
sweeping powers to bind all or any of their members. The majority would become powerless 
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onlookers; by taking a decision they would 'purport to repudiate' that which their 
'representatives' have somehow bound them to. 
Jordaan 36   puts forward the more consistent view that, in the case of union members, 
employment conditions agreed by the union may be considered to be incorporated into 
individual contracts of employment 'provided that the trade union acted as their duly 
authorized representative and within the scope of its mandate'. Where a union acts beyond 
its authority 'members may still be bound if they have either expressly or tacitly ratified the 
relevant terms' - or, in the case of employees employed subsequently to the collective 
agreement, on the basis of stipulatio alteri. 
Where a majoritarian system prevails - ie where an employer bargains with a majority union 
on behalf of all employees, 
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members and non-members alike - there are alternative constructions by which 
non-members may be held to be bound by such agreements. Firstly, some form of 
authorization to act on their behalf may be construed from the facts. Secondly, they may be 
estopped by their conduct from denying such authorization or may be deemed to have 
waived their right to do so. The bottom line, however, is that in the absence of a 
construction to this effect majoritarian bargaining may be at the mercy of non-members 
(who may be members of a rival union). Jordaan, seeing this as 'a clear illustration of the 
inability of common-law principles to deal with collective phenomena', concludes: 
 'One way out of the dilemma would be to recognise the subservience of the common law to collectively 
established norms and standards. It has been argued that it is not the contract of employment which brings the 
terms of industrial council agreements into operation, but membership of the relevant industry. If the 
non-statutory agreement is acknowledged as having the same normative effect as its statutory counterpart, it 
will also be membership of the relevant industry, enterprise or organisation . . . and not contract, that will 
determine the applicability of collectively established norms.' 
It may be argued that from this standpoint the distinction between union members and 
non-members is not particularly significant: a dissident minority of union members will be 
bound by the majority in precisely the same way as a dissident minority of non-union 
members. Conversely, the notion of the union as 'representative' of the workforce does not 
rely on union membership: any employee may expressly or implicitly accept a union as his 
or her representative. As Klare observed with reference to an early US case in point: 
 '[The court's] conception appeared to be that employees had a privilege to create a quasi-fiduciary or protected 
economic relationship between each of them individually and the others by constituting a collective bargaining 
unit and designating an "agent" or "agency" (a word commonly used to refer to unions in the early opinions) to 
represent them. 37 
The rights and duties of trade union membership per se, from this point of view, are of a 
different order. Members' rights relate essentially to control over the structure of the union, 
its finances, its office-bearers and its general policy. While the rule-book may provide for 
representation of members in collective bargaining, this cannot explain the role of the union 
in a majoritarian system. Jordaan is undoubtedly correct in arguing that the origin of the 
(majority) union's power to represent its constituency must be 
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sought at a more fundamental level than that of individual consensus or contract: it arises 
from the collective nature of employment and the demands of modern industrial society 
itself. 
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This offers an equitable basis for explaining union representation in the absence of 
common-law authorization. But it does not fully dispose the problems presented by the 
judgments discussed above. Accepting that a union may represent both members and 
non-members and that majorities must prevail over minorities, its authority can 
nevertheless not be unlimited. How do we determine what the union is legally entitled to do 
on behalf of such majorities? 
A clear decision by a majority of members, duly taken and recorded, might well amount to a 
binding contract in terms of the union's constitution. Even a decision by a majority of 
constituents could be regarded as a quasi-agency agreement. 38   But such cases are not 
typical. More usual is a situation where the union negotiates with a more or less flexible 
mandate to seek the best possible terms on behalf of its constituency and subsequently 
reports back for ratification of what it has done. For all the reasons advanced by Jordaan it 
would be misleading to construe this process in purely contractual terms. Nevertheless, 
some legal rule must be identified whereby the limits of the negotiators' discretion can be 
defined in the event of dispute. 
 
 
Principles of Collective Representation 
In the first place it is submitted that consent by a majority of employees to (a) the 
appointment of their bargaining agent and (b) the agreement concluded on their behalf 
should be essential. This raises the practical problem (which lies at the heart of the 
decisions discussed above) of how such consent is to be construed in the absence of a clear 
majority vote. 
Consent is implicit in the legal fiction of the incorporation of collective agreements into 
individual contracts of employment. Davies & Freedland, discussing the theories by which 
such incorporation has been explained, distinguish three main approaches: incorporation 
may take place 'by conduct', 'by agency', and 'by express reference in written contract or 
particulars'. 39   But all three, they note, are problematical. Which conduct on the part of 
the individual workers is needed to show acceptance of results of collective bargaining of 
which they might in fact be unaware? Even reference to a collective agreement in an 
individual contract might be a mere formality; and while the doctrine of constructive 
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notice might ensure enforceability, it does not address the more fundamental questions of 
employment equity and industrial relations. 
Agency, on the other hand, 'tends to be invoked in a restrictive sense 40   - ie in explaining 
how the union is bound by the agency of its members rather than how members become 
bound by unauthorized acts of the union. On the face of it this proposition is more 
consistent than that of the South African courts in the decisions discussed above; yet, 
surprisingly, it has been interpreted in such a way as to produce a similar practical result. 
Since the authority of shop stewards 'is derived from "the bottom" - that is, from all the 
members - it seems to follow [it has been held] that the members themselves must be 
taken to authorize whatever the union or its officials do on their behalf' unless they 
specifically disavow it. 41   We need only substitute the words 'directors' and 'company' for 
'shop stewards' and 'union' to see that this line of reasoning has little in common with the 
principles of agency which it purports to derive from. 
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Davies & Freedland conclude that agency 'is the most difficult of the three methods of 
incorporating the results of collective bargaining into individual contracts'. 42   In fact, it is 
submitted, the bottom line is expediency rather than the law of agency. As in South Africa it 
may no doubt be convenient if union officials are deemed to have the power to bind union 
members in order to streamline the bargaining process and make agreements stick; while 
the less convenient question of the members' rights vis-à-vis their 'agents' may be 
relegated to the background. 
If the rules of agency are inadequate to explain the relations between employees, unions 
and union officials in an area subject to important public interest considerations, a more 
sophisticated approach was implicit in the judgment of Centlivres JA in the old case of 
Amalgamated Engineering Union v Minister of Labour. 43   Here the learned judge appeared 
to distinguish three possible functions of a trade union in a bargaining situation: firstly, that 
of 
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'spokesman of its members; 44   secondly, to 'represent the interests of employees'; 45   
and, thirdly, to represent its own interests as a persona separate from its members. 46 
What is the difference between representing members and representing the interests of 
members (or other employees)? In the first case, it is submitted, the union would be acting 
essentially on the instructions of its members - in other words, as their agent - and all the 
requirements of agency should mutatis mutandis apply. In the second (and more typical) 
situation it is implied that no specific mandate (express or ostensible) can be identified. The 
question then becomes: has the union acted in the interests of (a majority of) the 
employees whom it was purporting to represent? 
This is the question that was highlighted in Ramolesane's case; and it is this question which 
is most relevant to the problem under discussion. It does not contradict the requirement of 
consent - ie subsequent ratification - by the employees whom the union represents. If the 
union's action is repudiated by a majority of those concerned, it must render such action 
invalid. This consequence, far from introducing uncertainty into collective bargaining, might 
rather concentrate the parties' minds on the need to arrive at agreements that genuinely 
express the will of (the majority of) those concerned. Unions would need to ensure that they 
obtain a new mandate when entering new bargaining territory. Situations where this cannot 
be done, it is submitted, would be exceptional and should not serve as basis for the rule. 
Employers, for their part, would be under a duty - analogous to that of a third party seeing 
to rely on an agent's ostensible authority 47   - to take reasonable steps to ascertain 
whether the union indeed has authority for the act in question. Obtaining a categorical 
assurance from the union, as in Ramolesane's case, might be a minimum requirement. If, 
however, it should turn out that the assurance was in fact unfounded, and if the union's 
constituents in no way contributed to the misunderstanding, it would hardly be fair if they 
were required to suffer the consequences. Rather, the loss should lie where it falls: it is the 
employer who would unfortunately but unavoidably be left with an unenforceable bargain 
but with a possible remedy against the union. 
But even such an ill wind might well blow some good by encouraging parties to tighten up 
on bargaining procedure. Employers, like wary purchasers, might learn the wisdom of not 
seeking to buy more than unions are able to deliver. Union officials might learn to be more 
careful to stay within their 
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mandates or pay the price in lost credibility with their membership as well as their 
bargaining partners. Union members could well discover the importance of more active 
involvement in union affairs. All this, it is submitted, would constitute a healthy 
development of the majoritarian system. 
 
 
Don Products (Pty) Ltd v Monage & Others 48 
In Don Products the Transvaal Division of the Labour Appeal Court went a considerable way 
towards upholding the principles discussed above. Once again Van Schalkwyk J was faced 
with an appeal in which the authority of union officials was at issue. The following summary 
of the facts is extracted from the headnote: 
 'After an illegal strike the appellant dismissed 156 employees. . . . The union and three representatives 
nominated by the dismissed employees then negotiated . . . with the appellant. An agreement was finally 
concluded in terms of which all but 16 of the dismissed employees would be re-employed. . . . The 16 
employees thereafter sought reinstatement.' 
Van Schalkwyk J found against the 16 employees on the basis that the union had been duly 
authorized to enter into the agreement in question. 'Much of the debate', the learned judge 
noted, 'centred upon the unlikelihood that the respondents would have authorized their 
representatives to have concluded an agreement so unfavourable to themselves. 49   This 
argument was rejected. The inevitability of selective re-employment had apparently been 
accepted by the workers. Debate between the workers and their representatives had only 
been concerned with the number of workers who would not be offered re-employment. On 
this basis the court applied the principle of majoritarianism as follows: 
 'At all times the workers understood that only a comparatively small number of their members would not be 
re-employed and it seems to me quite likely in the circumstances that the totality of the work-force would have 
agreed to abide the final decision upon the basis that each of them had a good chance of not finding themselves 
on the unfortunate list. 50 
However, it was held further that the respondents were prevented only from seeking 
reinstatement but not from seeking alternative relief since, on an analysis of the facts, the 
union's authority extended to the issue of reinstatement alone. In so doing the court 
disposed of the main underpinning of the decision in the 
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Food & General Workers Union case, as discussed above. As in that case, Van Schalkwyk J 
found that management and the workers' representatives had not been not ad idem as to 
the subject-matter of their agreement. In contrast to John AM's assumption that the 'effect' 
of the agreement should then be what the employer 'intended', however, Van Schalkwyk J 
ruled as follows: 
 '[T]he mere fact that management had that intention, does not yet disclose that the representatives of the 
workers, or for that matter the workers themselves, must have seen the matter in the same light. The onus is 
upon the appellant to establish not only that the agreement concluded is enforceable in its terms, but also that 
the representatives who appeared on behalf of the work-force were duly authorized to conclude an agreement 
in the terms stipulated. 51 
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Whatever the employer's intention may have been, the court found that the workers' 
authority to their representatives 'did not include an authority to deprive them of any other 
rights which they may have had against the appellants'. 52 
The significant feature of the judgment is the centrality which it attributes to the terms of 
the union's mandate and its acceptance that the union was bound to act in terms of such 
mandate. It is true that the effect of majoritarianism in this instance was to uphold, once 
again, a union agreement in the face of a challenge to its validity. The acid test, it is 
submitted, would be a situation where a union had acted contrary to the decision or against 
the interests of a majority of the employees concerned. It may well cause inconvenience if 
such an agreement, entered into bona fide by an employer, were to be ruled null and void. 
Counterposed to the employer's (or union's) convenience, however, is that of the union's 
constituency and the future of the bargaining relationship. Clear recognition of employees' 
right not to be bound by  unauthorized union acts, it is submitted, is fundamental to the 
longer term interests of collective bargaining. Don Products provides a valuable 
startingpoint for development in this direction. 53 
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